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MORGAN'S ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN EVIDENCE
LAW REFORM
There are two types of reformer-the meek and insinuating kind
that wear down resistance like water falling on a rock, and the
scrappy kind that carry the war into the enemy's country. Morgan
is of the latter type.
Five years active trial practice in Duluth gave him the savor of
evidence rules in action.
His first campaign for the betterment of evidence law was his
work as chairman of a distinguished committee of lawyers, law
teachers and judges set up by the Commonwealth Fund to propose
reforms in the law of evidence. Under Morgan's leadership the
committee "determined to develop a new method of approaching the
problem. Instead of relying upon opinion and a priori argument,
assistants were employed by the committee to compile factual material with regard to the actual status of the law and rules of evidence
in the various states and, inasmuch as many of the questions were
after all a matter of opinion, to collect the opinions of those who had
had actual experience with the working of the law of evidence in
their respective jurisdictions."' After five years of research, the
committee drafted and published five proposed uniform statutes with
supporting arguments which have been widely influential. These
proposals would (1) give added discretion to the judge so that he
need not apply the rules of evidence if he finds there is no bona fide
dispute as to the facts which the offered evidence tends to prove; (2)
empower the judge to comment on the weight of the evidence; (3)
abolish the Dead Man's Statute disqualifying interested survivors;
(4) admit in evidence the declarations of deceased persons; and (5)
simplify and modernize the admission of business entries. 2 Three of
these proposals, the first, third and fourth, were adopted as recommendations in 1936 by the American Bar Association.3 The fifth
proposal, embodying a Model Act on Business Records, has been the
model for the Federal Business Records Act 4 and for statutes in six
states, including New York.5 The Model Act, moreover, was the
starting point for the drafting of the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act, which has been enacted in twenty-six jurisdictions. 6 In
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result, then, this pioneer enterprise of research and drafting bore
good fruit.
Morgan's next important undertaking for the rebuilding of evidence law was the drafting of the Model Code of Evidence under
the aegis of the American Law Institute.7 At the inception of the
work in 1939 Morgan was appointed Reporter, and shouldered
the main responsibility for drafting the Code and presenting it to the
Advisers (about a dozen lawyers, law teachers and judges), to the
Council of the Institute and to the annual meetings of the more than
one hundred able and tough-minded lawyers and judges who composed the membership of the Institute. In the drafting Morgan was
ably assisted by Professor John M. Maguire. Professor John H, Wigmore was named as consultant.
Morgan presented three successive drafts of the Code at as many
Annual Meetings, and his mettle is revealed by reading the transcript
of the debates.8 Senator Pepper, the Chairman, skilfully channeled
the debate toward major issues, rather than details. At the meeting
when the first tentative draft of the Code was presented, Morgan was
faced with a cross-fire from two attackers upon the general form of
the proposed Code. Professor Wigmore advocated a more detailed
formulation of the rules after the manner of his own Code of Evidence, while on the other hand Judge Charles E. Clark, a member of
the Institute, contended that the proposed draft was too detailed, and
that it should be shorter, simpler and more flexible after the manner
of the then new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Morgan rejected
both of these opposite proposals for change in the style of the draft
and he was sustained by the meeting. 9
Morgan's conception of advocacy before a large group of lawyers
includes a willingness to express his disagreement in forthright
fashion, as is shown by this sample colloquy:
MR. ROSENTHAL: If this relates only to an appellate court, then I
would change the language to say "may have had substantial influence
in producing the verdict or finding."
MR. MORGAN: I should oppose that as long as I am able to oppose it.
That is keeping a rule which the most backward courts now enforce.
They say just what Mr. Rosenthal has said, that nobody can tell what
influenced a jury; and, of course, we agree to that. Nobody can tell what
influenced a jury. But when you have a rule to the effect that anything
that may have influenced the jury is ground for reversible error, you
mean that any error in the instruction or any error in the exclusion or
admission of evidence is ground for reversal. That is what it means;
7. For a brief history of the Code see the Introduction to MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE vii-xvi (1942).
8. These appear in vols. 17, 18 and 19 of the ALl PROCEEDINGS (1940, 1941,
1942).
9. For the debate and the outcome, see 17 ALl PROCEEDINGS 81-96 (1940).
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and if you take Mr. Rosenthal's amendment, you are not reforming anything. You are going back.1O

Again, when the famous Rule 303-recognizing a discretion in the
judge to exclude evidence otherwise admissible when he finds that
its probative value is outweighed by factors of time, prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or unfair surprise-was proposed
and strong opposition was voiced from the floor, Morgan made an
impassioned plea for the rule. Thereupon the Chairman appealed for
a "temperate spirit" in the debate. Morgan's response was characteristic:
Maybe you don't remember the first time the Reporter fulminated ...
and the Chairman came up to me and said "Eddie, please remember it
is not a criminal offense to make a suggestion." I do not intend to be too
warm about these things but you probably can tell from my name I am a
Welshman and a Welshman never feels anything moderately."1
Rule 303 was approved.
Perhaps the most radical change in existing law proposed by the
Reporter and his advisers is the provision embodied in rule 503
which admits evidence of a hearsay declaration wherever the declarant is found to be unavailable.'2 This stirred up a lively fusillade
of dissent, as might be expected, but the meeting after a closing
argument by Morgan voted its approval. 3
Some other major issues were resolved in the meetings adversely
to the Reporter's views. Thus, the Code as submitted to the meeting
provided in respect to presumptions that if the basic fact of the
presumption has any probative value as evidence of the presumed
fact, but is met by countervailing evidence, the party opposing the
presumption has the burden of persuasion to show the non-existence
of the presumed fact.14 The meeting, however, despite the body of
tradition supporting this practice, refused to accept it15 and decreed
that the rule should be rewritten to conform to the Thayer view
16
that the presumption "disappears" when met by counter evidence.
Another important defeat was in the field of privilege. The Reporter's draft contained no provision for a privilege for communications between patient and doctor. This omission provoked what was
perhaps the longest and liveliest debate in the whole series of meet10. 17 ALI PROCEEDINGS 110-11 (1940).

11. 19 ALI PROCEEDINGS 227 (1942).
12. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503 (1942):

"Evidence of a hearsay

declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant

(a) is unavailable as a witness, or
(b) is present and subject to cross-examination."
13. 18 ALI PROCEEDINGS 86-136 (1941).
14. The proposed rule appears in 18 ALI PROCEEDINGS 199-200. A similar
provision was adopted as UNiFomvm RULE OF EVIDENCE 14(a).
15. 18 ALI PROCEEDINGS 226 (1941).
16. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 221, 222 (1942).
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ings. 17 In the upshot there was incorporated in the Code a physicianpatient privilege but with the danger of injustice minimized by
including a provision that if the patient brings an action or interposes
a defence in which the condition of the patient is an element or factor
in the claim or defence, there is no privilege. 18
Despite these significant changes in the Reporter's draft, the fact
remains that the great body of the simplifying and clarifying provisions of the drafts were left unchanged in the cross-fire of debate,
and the Code stands as a monument to the learning, courage, and
clear thinking of the Reporter.
The Model Code was completed and published by the Institute
in 1942. Though widely cited in judicial opinions, it has not been
adopted in any state. Seemingly it was too advanced in its provisions
to meet general acceptance by the profession. But it was destined to
rise again. In 1949, seven years after the publication of the Code,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
accepted an offer of the Institute to make available to the Conference
the Model Code as a basis for the drafting of a new formulation of
rules of evidence. 19 A committee of the Conference, headed by Judge
Spencer A. Gard, of Kansas, was named to prepare the draft of the
new Uniform Rules, and the Institute appointed a committee, of
which Morgan was Chairman, to consider the drafts of the Conference
Committee in the hope that the new rules might be approved by the
20
Institute.
The close kinship of the new rules and the Model Code and the
guiding influence of Morgan in shaping the new Uniform Rules are
reflected in the following passages in the prefatory note to the Uniform Rules:
The Conference has recognized its obligation to use The American Law
Institute's Model Code of Evidence as a basis from which to work, and
has proceeded accordingly. That thorough, candid work by the nation's
best talent commands respect. But if its departures from traditional
and generally prevailing common law and statutory rules of evidence
are too far-reaching and drastic for present day acceptance, they should
be modified in such respects as will express a common ground of acceptability in the jurisdictions and by the tribunals which the rules are
expected to serve. So with the objects of acceptability and uniformity
in mind, this effort is devoted to the policy of retaining such parts of the
Model Code as appear to meet the requirements of such objectives, and to
reject, revise or modify the rest.
Even before the appointment of the American Law Institute Committee,
17. 19 ALI PROCEEDINGS 183-217 (1942).
18. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 223 (3)
19. UNIFrom RuLEs OF EVIDENCE at 3.

20. Id. at 2, 4.

(1942).
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the Committee of the Conference had established the practice of submitting its drafts of material to Professor Morgan for his comments and
suggestions, in view of the fact that he had been chairman of the original
committee of the Institute which drafted the Model Code of Evidence.
After the appointment of the American Law Institute Committee it became the policy to submit our material to Professor Morgan, who in turn
sent copies of it with his comments to the members of his committee.
They in turn made comments, criticisms and suggestions of their own,
and many of their suggestions have been adopted and are reflected in
these Rules.21
The Uniform Rules of Evidence were approved by the Conference
and by the American Bar Association in 1953. It is to be hoped that

these rules, bearing as they do at one remove the imprint of Morgan's
genius, may in the fullness of time have a wide acceptance in the
statute books and the rules of courts.

In any event, from the foregoing record, it is clear that Morgan is
entitled to a place beside Thayer and Wigmore as one of the master
builders of evidence law.
CHARLEs T. McCoRMICK*
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